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FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
KENNETH S. CARLSTON*
I
ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM
Within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is found
the largest common market in the world today The federal con-
stitution insures that none of the states may interfere with the
interstate operation of that market. The Sherman Act denies power
to corporate organizations to impose restraints upon or monopolize
any part of interstate commerce in that market. Given the physical
and human resources found within the United States, the result has
been an enormously productive economy characterized by competi-
tion and rivalry within the vast number of individual markets which,
in the aggregate, become the interstate commerce of the United
States.
The philosophy of the Sherman Act has been that the economic
strength of the United States will best be served by open markets
and a competitive system. In essence, the Sherman Act has insisted
that no entrepreneur may relinquish to competitors the power to
make decisions for him in respect to his market relations, and that
the making of such decisions by an entrepreneur shall always be
subject to the pressures of competition. An economic system so
structured and conducted, it was felt, would best promote the
national welfare in that it would bring about the most efficient
utilization of national resources and create the maximum national
power, consumer satisfaction and economic strength. The wealth
of our nation and its military strength can be no greater than the
economic base upon which they rest.
The premise of the Sherman Act has worked well in its applica-
tion to interstate commerce of the United States. Here the legisla-
tive or judicial power can effectively repair the havoc which a too
rigorous and logical application of the premise might create. Com-
petition is always desirable until it hurts. When it hurts group
interests numerous enough to make their outcries heard in the
national forum, competition is no longer an ideal but becomes an
evil. Statutory relief from the impact of the Sherman Act is then
the usual result. The bleak blasts of competition are tempered by
Robinson-Patman prohibitions against price-cutting and Fair Trade
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
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Act permission to fix prices. The marketing of agricultural products
is to a large extent exempt from the command to compete. In the
domain of the Sherman Act itself, only unreasonable restraints are
unlawful, although certain types of restraints have been judicially
declared to be inherently unreasonable and therefore illegal per se.
All these measures are possible because of the sovereign supremacy
of the United States within its territorial jurisdiction and the power
of the legislature and the courts to channel business conduct toward
desired goals.
Beyond the territorial confines of the United States, however,
the legal supremacy of its sovereign power ceases to exist. No longer
is there a common market which may be kept open by legislative
fiat. No longer are all persons, including lesser governmental aind
corporate bodies, subject to the exclusive control of the federal
government. The national government is but one among many gov-
ernments which are in turn a product of their respective national
cultures and histories. The policies of each government reflect its
national system of values and pressures which the group interests
within its society bring to bear.
In this context, the United States has adopted a number of
premises, not always consistent with one another, designed to pre-
serve its external avenues to power. Among these are
(1) Adequate supply of foreign products and services for
American purchasers and disposition abroad of American products
and services shall be primarily the responsibility of private (as
opposed to governmental) initiative.
(2) Whenever adequate foreign supplies or foreign markets
cannot be so obtained, public intervention through support and
encouragement of private initiative or, when necessary, through
public organizations such as the International Bank, is justified.
(3) Whenever domestic commerce is injured by foreign sup-
ply, public intervention, by means of tariff, import quotas or other
restrictive devices designed to exclude the undesired foreign coim-
petition, is justified.
(4) The foreign commerce of the United States shall be pro-
tected from restraint or monopoly as against all persons who may
properly be held to be subject to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
the United States. These are, in general, United States nationals
and persons (physical and legal) who are not United States
nationals but who are found in the United States and who per-
form, or cause to be performed, acts abroad intended to have, and
Vol. 40:125
ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST LAWS
in fact having, effects within the territory of the United States or
upon its commerce.'
Two observations concerning the foregoing structure of premises
or postulates are in order: First, the premise of the Sherman Act
contained in (4) above is antithetical to that of protectionism set
forth in (3) above. Second, the system of premises as a whole
proceeds from the fundamental assumption that our national power
rests upon a national territorial base, and that, consequently, policy
should be determined from the standpoint of the impact of specific
measures upon national territorial interests. Each of these com-
ments, and particularly the second, needs clarification.
The moment that we pass beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States we are no longer in an open market in which each
state is by the federal constitution enjoined from imposing import
or export duties and each corporate organization is by the Sherman
Act enjoined from restrictive or monopolistic conduct. The policy
objective in the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act
cannot be the creation of an open world ,market which will be
analogous to our open national market. Though the threads of our
commerce are intertwined with those of other states and though
the national power of other states is, in varying degree, dependent
upon our national power, we cannot by our legislative command
create an open world market. Pressures to this end can be set in
motion as against particular foreign economic organizations which
may happen to become subject to our territorial jurisdiction by
doing business here. These pressures are, however, at best fortuitous
in their application. They are always subject to the necessity of
recognizing overriding foreign law to the contrary.- Instead, the
Sherman Act seeks to protect American foreign commerce in a
world economy which is in fact characterized to a considerable ex-
tent by policies of restrictionism. It must be admitted that the
United States is also pursuing similar policies of restrictionism.
Furthermore, it never permits its antitrust hand to know what
its tariff hand is doing.
1. See the discussion of the principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction in
relation to the Sherman Act in Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 569, 573-86 (1954).
2. See British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
Ltd., [1952] All E. R. 780 (C.A.), discussed Carlston, sipra note I at 582;
see also United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F Supp. 835, 878 (D. N.J.
1953) : "Philips shall not be in contempt of this Judgment for doing anything
outside of the United States which is required or for not doing anything out-
side of the United States which is unlawful under the laws of the government,
province, *country or state in which Philips or any other subsidiaries may be
incorporated, chartered or organized or m the territory of which Philips or
any such subsidiaries may be doing business. "
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Churchill is said to have remarked that it makes considerable
difference which end of the rifle one is looking at. Policies which
may seem consistent, desirable and even noble to their framer will
not necessarily so appear to those subjected to their impact. To the
foreign observer, our advocacy of a competitive open market appears
to extend only to foreign markets for American products, he will
point out that when domestic producers feel the impact of foreign
competition, we quickly abandon our policy of free competition and
adopt tariff and other restrictive barriers used by other nations.
To him, our support of expanding, competitive, dynamic markets
in the international scene is not an end of policy but a means to
economic penetration of other states while we continue to maintain
our own trade barriers for the protection of our domestic market.
So much for the antithesis between premises (3) and (4) as
stated above. We now turn to the inadequacy of this system of
premises in the light of the changed world of today and the need
for their recasting in a larger framework of policy
Policy cannot be framed apart from facts. What is the economic
world today of which the United States is a part? What are its
major configurations of trade? How does the United States affect
such trade patterns? What are its primary political and economic
interests in shaping such trade patterns? Given these conditions.
what changes in our antitrust laws are desirable "
II
THE EcoNoMIc WORLD TODAY
Today no individual, no organization, no community or no state
exists in isolation. Communities vary as to the character of their
l4bor supply and accessibility of and endowment with natural re-
sources. States vary as to their supply of labor, capital equipment,
productive land, mineral deposits, accessibility and climate. Differ-
ences in the scarcity and character of these factor endowments in-
evitably produce trade. Members of a community or society may
remain at home but the product of the labor of many of them is
made possible by purchases abroad and is paid for by sales abroad.
The forces of "relative endowment with the productive factors.
social conditions of production, economies of large-scale production,
and costs of transfer" are constantly acting and reacting upon one
another 3
By the end of 1953, the trade of the world had a volume of over
3. Ellswortb, International Economics 133 (1938)
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75 billion dollars.4 Before the second world war, the bulk of world
trade was multilateral; trade balances were settled through a world-
wide system which also provided for the service of foreign invest-
ment of European creditor countries, particularly the United King-
dom. After the first world war, the functioning of this system was
supported by United States capital exports. As these capital ex-
ports began to dwindle after 1928 and creditor countries began to
repatriate their liquid funds, the functioning of the system was
disturbed. After the financial crisis of 1931, many countries sought
to balance their foreign transactions by import restrictions. The
spread of this practice and consequent retaliation resulted in the
replacement of multilateral by bilateral trade. Yet inherently the
diversity of the means of world production must lead to a multi-
lateral pattern of trade embracing the world.'
By the end of 1947, Europe's working population and produc-
tive capital were up to the prewar level. However, the impact of the
second world war fell unequally upon the industry of the individual
countries; some increased their productive capacity greatly while
the industry of other countries was seriously crippled.0 The cleavage
between eastern and western Europe and the change in the econ-
omies of the former created considerable difficulties. Western
Europe lost its creditor position and its supply of much essential
foodstuffs and raw materials which had to be found elsewhere. The
dollar area proved to be the major substitute supplier, thereby en-
hancing the dollar shortage of western Europe. Yet the United
States did not provide a market of commensurate scope. Its im-
ports were notably of primary goods while tariffs prevented it from
becoming a market which could absorb the imports of manufactured
goods necessary to achieve a balance of payments. The loss of
foreign investments, the diminishment of opportunities to earn dol-
lars indirectly through trade with other regions selling in the dollar
area, the considerable increase in the price of primary goods re-
quired by western Europe compared with the failure of the prices
of its manufactures to advance correspondingly, were other forces
leading to the precarious trade position of western Europe." Al-
though there has been some lessening of the dependence of world
trade outside the United States upon its import balance with the
4. Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
International Trade 6 (1954).
5. League of Nations, The Netvork of World Trade 7-10 (Publications,
I. Economic and Financial 1942. IL A. 3.).
6. United Nations, Economic Survey of Europe Since tie War,1-9, 81
[U.N. Doc. No. E/ECE/157 (1953)1.
7 Id., Ch. 2.
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United States," the problem of the dollar shortage remains a major
problem in international trade.
The underdeveloped countries are similarly exposed to the fluc-
tuating forces of a world economy which they can do little to con-
trol. They are dependent on the export of raw materials for a
substantial proportion of their income. The rather extreme fluctua-
tions in the prices of primary commodities in world markets have
led to correspondingly wide fluctuation of their income, and, in ad-
dition, have made it difficult to budget an orderly program of
economic growth. Attempts to free themselves from their depend-
ence on the sale of primary goods in the world markets by local
industrial expansion have produced internal dislocations in their
economies. The increased industrialization generated a rise in total
money incomes which in turn led to an increased demand for con-
sumer goods, especially food. The latter, however, were not forth-
coming in a sufficiently increased supply to prevent inflation. In-
deed, the expanded foreign exchange earnings were in considerable
measure used to import foodstuffs. Yet the underlying social demand
for imports of capital goods will continue to press upon the indus-
trialized regions and to compete, in the latter, with the demands of
rerarmament and expanding economies.9
As pointed out above, the fortunes of countries are a product
not only of their native endowments but also of fate in that, thrust
into a world economy, they have become subject to the vicissitudes
of a world economy Prices, foreign exchange position and foreign
investment influence trade as well as the factor of comparative
advantage. The fall of prices for primary goods since 1951 has
forced their producers to cut down their imports of manufactured
goods from industrial areas. The deficit in the dollar trade of west-
ern Europe was balanced by United States economic assistance. Of
late, the availability of competing goods at competitive prices from
non-dollar countries has increased. This fact, and probably the in-
fluence of governmental pressures and controls, has resulted in a
considerable shift of trade channels.
The monetary disorganization of the earlier postwar years has
accelerated the emergence of patterns of regional trade. There has
been a strong intensification of trade between each industrial region
and that non-industrial area which, for monetary and other reasons.
is most closely connected with it. This tendency is most marked in
8. United Nations, World Economic Report 1953-54, 91 [U.N. Doc. No.
E/2729, ST/ECA/30 (1955) 1.
9. United Nations, World Economic Report 1951-1952, 14 [U.N. I)oc.
No. E/2353, Rev. 1, ST/ECA/19 (1953)].
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the trade in manufactures. Trade has also tended to become more
concentrated within certain monetary or political areas.20
As we move from the fortunes of particular countries to over-all
patterns, trade has not grown as rapidly as world production and
the share of world output entering international trade was much
smaller during the postwar years than in the decade following World
War 1.11 This is particularly the case in manufactured goods. Yet
this very increase in productive power renders each industrialized
country and each underdeveloped country increasingly at the mercy
of the impersonal forces of a world economy
Although the United States is the repository of the greatest
productive energy in the world today its economic strength rests to
a great extent upon its imports. It "consumes about half the mate-
rials of the free world and is the major single importer of most
materials."'" An important consequence of this fact is that the
countries supplying such imports are considerably dependent upon
American purchases for their economic well-being. The United
States is in addition "'the world's major source of capital, equip-
ment, technology, and management skills, all essential to promote
materials production and general economic advancement in less de-
veloped areas."' 3 Within the last ten years our government has
made foreign loans or grants for economic purposes amounting to
about forty billion dollars while private foreign investment has
amounted to about twelve and. a half billion dollars.14
There is a logic in the pattern of our economic relationships with
the rest of the world which we cannot escape. We are faced with an
increasing need for imports, particularly of raw materials and
minerals, as our own natural resources are being exhausted and
our economy continues to expand. At the same time, exports must
be increased to maintain our national income, on the one hand, and
to satisfy the demands of other countries of the world for their own
economic development and growth, on the other hand. Since equi-
librium between our imports and exports is lacking, particularly in
manufactures, we must stimulate the process of foreign investment
to assist in closing the dollar gap. Our dependence on the free world
for supplies and markets is an economic fact which must be recog-
nized in shaping our foreign policy.
10. Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 5-23, United Nations, op. cit. stpra note 8, at 105.
11. Id. at 5.
12. 1 President's Materials Policy Commission, Resources for Freedom
59 (1952).
13. IbM.
14. Address of Secretary Dulles, October 10, 1955, N. Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1955, p. 14, cols. 4-5. 1
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Elsewhere in the world there is a drive toward economic as well
as political freedom. The underdeveloped countries of the world are
seeking to develop their own internal resources in order that their
economies, and hence their policies, shall not be so closely tied with
those states which are their markets. They are seeking to develop
balanced economies of manufacture, agriculture and the extractive
industries. They are seeking for their peoples the increased oppor-
tunities for participation which an industrial society provides. These
drives are heightened by fear of colonialism and imperialism from
whose pressures they feel they are not yet wholly free.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the following conclu-
sions would seem to be well sustained
(1) The free western world has not yet achieved a stable and
enduring economic base for its international trade. Regional trad-
ing areas rather than multilateral world trading patterns predomi-
nate. Western Europe in particular has lost its creditor position and
has had to turn to the dollar area for much of its supplies. Many of
its former markets, particularly in the Communist sphere of in-
fluence, have been largely lost or lessened. The United States has
not provided a substitute market of commensurate scope because of
its essential disinterest in manufactures as compared with primary
goods.
(2) The unstable and precarious basis upon which the present
economic structure of the western world rests may at any time. if
the elements of its support should change for the worse, thrust it
into a period of bilateral and restrictionist approaches to inter-
national trade.
(3) The restrictionist policies of the United States are under
present conditions a powerful discouragement to the opening of
free world trade. Governmental loans and grants and the stock-
piling of strategic materials have helped to diminish the instability
implicit in the dollar gap but they can be no enduring solution for
the dollar shortage. They can never be a substitute for stable and
expanding trade relationships and the stable currency relations
which such trade relationships will produce. They can never be a
substitute for open, expanding markets characterized by an absence
of restrictive trade barriers, whether they be public, such as tariffs
and quotas, or private, such as cartel agreements.
(4) The creditor position of the United States, coupled with
its reluctance to accept payments by its debtors in trade instead of
dollars. erects a serious obstacle to the establishment of a healthy'
[ ol. 40:125
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international trade in the western world which is a primary objec-
tive of our foreign economic policy.
(5) Participating m and supported by a world economy, the
United States has a responsibility to make that economy work well.
The very size of the United States in world markets is a measure
of its responsibility.
(6) One of the most serious and continuing problems faced in
the development of world trade is the dollar shortage. Its solution
rests not only in the gradual elimination of restrictionist policies in
the United States, but also in the increase of foreign investment
or capital export by the United States.
III
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST
Foreign economic policy cannot be considered apart from politi-
cal objectives and realities. Indeed, the clarity of our thinking would
be enormously helped if we would cease thinking of economic and
political issues as occupying separate compartments for purposes of
policy. As the writer has said elsewhere, "questions of foreign policy
involve a system or structure of relationships, in which each com-
ponent part involves stresses and strains upon each other and all
are dependent upon one another and all must be preserved in a nice
balance if the maximum effect of policy is to be achieved."'15
Nevertheless, using the term "political" in its narrower sense,
the postwar years have brought about the following developments
in the political sphere:
(1) The separation of the sphere of Communist power and in-
fluence bounded by the Iron Curtain.
(2) The emergence of defense alliances in the western nations,
notably NATO and the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at
Baghdad on February 24, 1955.
(3) The emergence of neutralist groups of varying component
elements, depending upon the issues of policy at stake. For ex-
ample, issues of anti-colonialism will tend to elicit a larger grouping
of states in the Middle East and in southern and southeast Asia
than will issues limited to the Israeli-Arab conflict.
(4) Rivalry for influence and support in the neutralist groups
between the United States and western European policy on the one
hand and Soviet or Communist state policy on the other hand.
(5) The coordination of political policies of the United States
and western European nations, insofar as they involve issues of
15. Carlston, Elements of Peace, 1 J. Pub. L. 11, 37 (1952).
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East-West rivalry and power. Accompanying this development is
the emergence of policies directed toward the economic integration
of western Europe.
A salient fact which has become apparent in the conduct of
foreign policy in the postwar years is that of competition. The
United States has long realized and the Soviet has recently come to
realize that each is a competitor for the support of other states.
Through the Communist party it has been possible for the Soviet
to coordinate the policies of its satellite states with its own. This
fact remains considerably true even in China and Yugoslavia. Be-
yond the Iron Curtain and beyond the borders of the United States,
however, Soviet and United States foreign policy are constantly
subject to the critical examination of other states. The United
States has learned, and the Soviet has just begun to learn, that each
aspect of foreign policy must be so shaped that it will find the
largest possible denominator of common interest with other states.
Elements of national interest which might otherwise cast a policy
measure in rigid and highly nationalistic terms must be minimized
in favor of flexible terms which will reflect the interests and aspira-
tions of other states, if their adherence and support is desired.
The makers of American foreign policy are thus constantly sub-
ject to two forces which often pull in opposite directions. Our
foreign policy must be so framed as to command support within
the United States itself, and also harmonize our national interest
with those of other nations. In the economic sphere, this means that
policies of restrictionism designed to protect particular group inter-
ests must always clash with policies of open markets designed to
serve the national welfare as a whole. In the last analysis, American
producers as a whole have little to fear from foreign competition.
Furthermore, it is to the best interest of the American consumer
and of the United States as a creditor nation to welcome foreign
competitors who can serve American markets more efficiently than
domestic producers. This is not to say that the displacement of the
latter from the market as a result of foreign competition should not
be orderly and with the minimum of individual detriment. It is not
to say that their retirement from the market is not a matter of
governmental concern. It is only to say that no longer can the
United States treat issues involving the exclusion of foreign goods
from its markets as issues of purely domestic policy Any such ex-
clusion necessarily affects our relations with other states and the
total structure and effect of our foreign economic policy
The United States has an affirmative interest in the develop-
[Vol. 40:125
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ment of open, expanding markets in and among the western nations.
As a means to that end, it has an interest in the elimination of re-
strictive business practices in international trade and in the internal
trade of other countries. It has an interest that the economies of
our friends and allies shall be viable and vigorous. These interests
are a political necessity, for the military strength of the western
nations is a product of their economic base.
In summary, our foreign economic policy may be said to com-
prise the following objectives.
(1) To preserve and develop markets for our products.
(2) To assure the supply of the materials necessary for the func-
tioning of our economy and our armed forces.
(3) To strengthen the economies and trade of the free nations
in order to promote our national interest in
(a) Establishing stable political regimes demonstrating the
workability of the democratic processes.
(b) Strengthening the military potential of the western nations
and the loyal support of their peoples.
(c) Assuring the continuance of the trade patterns of the free
world upon which our national power depends.
(4) To achieve the benefits flowing from the international divi-
sion of labor, multilateral trade, stable currencies and the elimina-
tion of restrictive business practices.
The extent to which our antitrust laws should be amended to
help accomplish these objectives will be our next topic of inquiry.
IV
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS"
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENiERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE
The recent Report of the Attorney General's National Commit-
tee to Study the Antitrust Laws of March 31, 1955, largely eschewed
public issues of the kind dealt with up to this point. The report
states that "this Committee 'has made no independent factual study
to provide any basis for determining whether our antitrust laws
have helped or hindered the foreign commerce of the United States
or for generalizing about the effect of antitrust on any related gov-
ernmental policy." 6
f This was a sound decision. The committee was largely com-
posed of practising lawyers and law professors. Its time and funds
were limited. It accordingly limited its inquiry to antitrust doctrine.
16. Report 66. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws of March 31, 1955, hereinafter referred to as--
Report.
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What is the law ? Should any existing rules be changed ? These were
its two central questions. They must be answered as part of any
general inquiry into the adequacy of our antitrust laws. The task is
not, however, done until the additional question is answered Is
the law satisfactory in the light of all relevant considerations of
policy ?
This paper can hardly suffice to answer this last question. 'That
question is one which should be the subject of still another task
force inquiry The Attorney General's National Committee may it-
self be regarded as a precedent for the appointment of a new com-
mittee to study foreign economic policy and, as part thereof, the
incidence of the foreign application of the antitrust laws. Private
funds could most usefully be made available for this purpose. A
general study of this nature is a most important order of business
today
Before beginning our inquiry into Chapter II of the conmittee's
report, dealing with the application ot the antitrust laws to "trade
or commerce with foreign nations," this much can be said by
way of an introduction The determination of policy in the promo-
tion of our foreign trade and commerce and the strengthening of
our political relationships with the free world cannot be shaped by
the logic of the Sherman Act alone. Our interest in the elimination
of restrictive business practices in international trade, which ad-
mittedly exists, is part of a larger interest in promoting our foreign
commerce and developing the economies of the states in the free
world. Hence the foreign application of the Sherman Act must be
viewed from the standpoint of the realities of the process of foreign
investment and the conduct of business abroad. In this context.
value judgments as to specific policies must be made from the
standpoint of the national interest.
There may well be measures which the national interest would
dictate but the Sherman Act prevent. An underdeveloped state,
long a victim of imperialist control by a single western power or
under the dominance of a single international corporate enterprise,
may insist on a joint sharing by corporate enterprises of a number
of western states in the development of its new industries. The in-
vestment required and the risks involved in the foreign field may
mean that foreign investment may be feasible only if there be a
joint sharing of capital investment among several large corpora-
tions. Local business interests in a foreign country may demand
certain assurances of protection without which their participation
in a new enterprise cannot be had. All of these may raise issues
[ Vol.40:125
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which cannot be solved within the terms of the antitrust laws but
only through a weighing of the various values implicit in the term
national interest.
We now turn to an examiation of the committee's report.
(1) The committee does not approve "any proposal for blanket
exempption of foreign commerce from the antitrust laws" or "their
substantial revision to define specifically legal and illegal conduct
in foreign commerce transactions."'1 It does, however, approve
"advance discussions [by the Department of Justice] with affected
agencies concerning projected antitrust proceedings seriously in-
volving any of the Government's foreign programs."'18 In addition,
it recommends that the immuity from antitrust prosecution accord-
ed voluntary agreements among competitors requested by the Presi-
dent and approved by the Attorney General under the Defense Pro-
duction Act 9 be extended for a designated period beyond the act's
expiration, subject to certain conditions. -0
If antitrust enforcement is to be coordinated with our foreign
economic policy, it should be possible for any conduct abroad- serv-
ing the national interest, as determined by the executive, to obtain
antitrust immunity.2- Such is the political climate in the United
States that we may rest assured that the executive would not lightly
make any such finding. When it is remembered that the exemption
thus to be accorded will be limited to conduct abroad, i.e., produc-
tion or market practices in foreign countries, the likelihood of
prejudice to the national interest in the administration of this im-
munity would not appear to be substantial as against the advan-
tages which it would achieve.
We have in the preceding pages of this study made evident the
importance of the process of foreign investment today as a means
toward reaching a number of the goals of our foreign economic
policy. While we must not succumb to the restrictionist policies of
other states, we must be free to permit such measures of joint action
and joint risk-taking as may be necessary to promote our foreign
commerce and expanding economies of the free nations. At least a
procedure should be provided whereby the executive could consider
17 Ibid.
18. Id. at 97.
19. 64 Stat. 798 (1950), 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 2061-2066 (1951), as
amended, 67 Stat 129 (1953), 50 U. S. C. A. App. §§ 2061-6166, particularly§ 2158 (Curn. Supp. 1955).
20. Report 109.
21. For a suggestive list of criteria for determining the national inter-
est in this connection, see Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 569, 572-573 (1954).
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such questions of policy and permit business conduct which pro-
motes the national interest that might otherwise be frustrated by
the antitrust laws.
(2) The committee is of the view that the Sherman Act applies
to conduct abroad of aliens when it is intended to have, and in fact
has "substantial anticompetitive effects on our foreign commerce."
When the foreign conduct involves foreign and American firms or
American firms alone, then antitrust violation should occur when it
produces "such substantial anticompetitive effects on this country's
'trade or commerce with foreign nations' as to constitute un-
reasonable restraints. 2
The assertion of jurisdiction over the conduct of foreigners in
their own country which is lawful under their system of laws raises
serious questions of national policy In general, persons should be
subject to only one system of law at a time.23 Where it is clear that
the effect of foreign conduct was intended to be primarily localized
in the United States and was in fact so localized, there may be some
justification for asserting jurisdiction and departing from the gen-
eral rule. If conduct taking place in one state and having an intended
effect in another is regarded by both states, as well as by civilized
nations generally, to be criminal in nature, the objective territorial
principle would permit the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
It is an extreme step, however, to extend the objective territorial
principle to a case involving conduct which produces effects in the
state of the forum solely as a consequence of the fact that the con-
duct in question was a product of decision in the foreign state as to
how business should be conducted generally outside the territory of
such state.24 It may finally be remarked that the prediction of anti-
trust consequences for specific conduct is highly complex and prob-
lematical for the American businessman and lawyer, much greater
will be the hazards of prediction for the foreign businessman and
his lawyer who are unfamiliar with our legal system. They may not
even realize that an antitrust issue exists.
It may be questioned whether the existing principles of extra-
territorial jurisdiction as they have been developed in antitrust
22. Report 76.
23. See opinion of Judge J. B. Moore in Case of S.S. "Lotus," P C. I. J.,
Ser. A., No. 10 at 92 (Sept. 7, 1927). "If two laws were present at the same
time and in the same place upon the same subject we should also have a con-
dition of anarchy." 1 Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 46 (1935).
24. "If international trade and commerce is to expand and if nations
are to live as neighbors, it is necessary that nations observe the first principle
of good neighborly relations, which is. Do not try to tell your neighbor how
to manage affairs in his own household." Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton
Co., Ltd., 133 F Supp. 522, 529 (S.D. N.Y. 1955)
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cases are justified as a matter of law or policy.-5 Wqiile we may not
wish voluntarily to relinquish the principles of extraterritorial juris-
diction available to our legislative and judicial bodies for purposes
of control, we may well wish not to become the captives of their
logic. We should at least provide an opportunity to consider specific
practices in the light of the national interest and not solely from the
point of view of the rigorous postulates of the Sherman Act. It
would seem desirable that the enforcement of the antitrust laws in
respect of conduct abroad, whether by aliens or our own nationals,
should be subject to the decision of the Department of State as well
as the Department of Justice. The committee's proposal of advance
discussion of projected antitrust suits in the foreign field with other
governmental agencies concerned is to be commended. The co-
ordination of our foreign economic policies and the principle of
respect for other states demand no less. This is an area in which
diplomacy, negotiation and compromise should be utilized rather
than the brutal assertion of unilateral power arising from the
fortuitous circumstance of personal jurisdiction over foreign de-
fendants.
(3) The committee very properly condemns the implications of
the Tinken2 G and inesota Mijnng 27 cases that the Sherman Act
prohibits American investment for production abroad as a restraint
on American exports. -s There is no justification in law or policy
for such a narrow construction of the term "foreign commerce." If
the misconception of these cases should persist, there will be im-
perative need for clarifying legislation.
(4) The committee points out that "the inquiry required by the
Rule of Reason may in some foreign commerce cases involve con-
sideration of market factors not operative in domestic commerce...
We believe that defendants should be allowed to show that, due to
foreign economic or political barriers, their conduct at bar was pre-
requisite to trade or investment in a foreign county . Similarly,
we believe that should, for example, the laws of another country
require uniform noncompetitive prices by companies doing business
there, then compliance with that law should constitute a defense in
this country to an antitrust charge of price-fixing solely in that
country "29
25. See Carlston, supra note 21, at 574-586.
26. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 593, 599(1951).
27 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 92 F.
Supp. 947, 962 (D. Mass. 1950).
28. Report 77-80.
29. Id.,at8l,83.
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Yet the fact remains, as the dissent remarked in the Timkcn
case, that it is not for the courts "to formulate economic policy as to
foreign commerce. '30 This fact reinforces the desirability of the
suggestion made in (2) above that the Department of State partici-
pate in antitrust enforcement abroad. Flexibility must supersede
rigidity in the foreign application of the antitrust laws.
(5) The committee rejected the implication of the Timkcn case
that the conduct of a foreign business by an American firm through
a subsidiary corporation might raise issues of "intra-enterprise con-
spiracy" under the Sherman Act.31 It rightly felt that criteria of
substance rather than form should here govern.32
The writer is not convinced that the pronouncements of the com-
mittee will suffice to remove the rule of "intra-enterprise conspiracy"
from current antitrust doctrine, whether applied to interstate"" or
foreign commerce. The rule is one in which the economic soundness
of its application in the particular case is a matter of chance rather
than reason. It should be eliminated.
34
(6) The risks of foreign enterprise are such that often it will
be undertaken only if the venture be shared by two or more
American firms. Sometimes it is highly desirable as a practical
matter that entry to the foreign market be obtained through pur-
chase of the goodwill of an existing foreign firm. Such a purchase
may be made by a single American firm or sometimes it may be
practicable only as a joint venture among two or more American
firms.
The undertaking of such ventures is in the national interest.
since they reflect the process of private foreign investment. Our
government is taking vigorous steps to encourage this process. Its
promotion is an established part of our foreign economic policy
Yet the antitrust risks incident to ventures of this nature are such
as to discourage them powerfully In predicting future judicial be-
havior, the antitrust counsellor cannot dismiss the Minnesota Min-
ing33 and the Imperial Chemical Industries0 cases with the aplomb
30. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 593, 605
(1951).
31. Id. at 606-607
32. Report 88-89.
33. Id. at 30-36.
34. See the discussion on this point in Carlston, Basic Antitrust Con-
cepts, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1033, 1040-1045 (1955).
35. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 92 F
Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
36. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F Supp.
504 (S.D. N.Y. 1951) and 105 F Supp. 215 (S.D. N.Y. 1952)
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of the committee's report.37 Nor can he afford to overlook the im-
plications of Timken38 regarding joint foreign ventures.
The formal legal permission to a single American company or
group of American companies to establish manufacturing or dis-
tributing facilities abroad, absent dominance of the owner companies
or restraint or monopoly, which the cases seem to concede,39 and
with which the committee seems to be satisfied,40 is no solution of
the basic problem. As has been pointed out elsewhere, the anti-
trust risk arises from the continued operation of the foreign enter-
prise and its consequent effect upon business decisions of the owner
companies.41 It is more or less inevitable that in such circumstances
there will be an accumulation of business decisions among the owner
companies that foreign business inquiries should be served by the
foreign subsidiary rather than by the American owner company.
The patterns of business conduct thus revealed will be charged to
constitute a division of markets and perhaps price-fixing. The mere
possibility of exclusion of American competitors from the foreign
market served by the jointly owned foreign plant may be charged to
be a restraint. 2 The sounder rule should be an acknowledgment
of the fact that if the joint venture were in the first instance lawful,
no antitrust violation should result from the circumstance that busi-
ness was relinquished to the foreign enterprise by the owner com-
panies as a matter of business judgment, rather than as a result of
any independent agreement not to compete. Moreover, there should
be no inhibitions upon the establishment of foreign facilities by
American firms, whether jointly or otherwise, when they promote
the national interest and where the effect upon American competi-
tors is conjectural and incidental.
(7) The committee, by a majority vote, refrained from com-
menting on the control of restrictive business practices through
37. Report 90-91.
38. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F Supp. 284 (N.D.
Ohio 1949), affdsub. mnw. Tinken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U. S. 593 (1951).
39. See notes 35, 36 and 38 supra; also United States v. E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 219 (D. Del. 1953). See Note, Foreign
Subsidiaries in American Law, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 559 (1952).
40. "Manufacturing or distribution activities carried on abroad by
American firms alone, or combined with foreign competitors, should be up-
held unless they create unreasonable restraints on the commerce of the
United States. . They should thus be deemed beyond the reach of our
antitrust laws if they involve no restrictions on American imports or exports
of goods or capital and do not unreasonably restrain competition in American
markets." Report 90.
41. Nitschke, The Antitrust Laws in Foreign Commerce, 53 Mich. L.
Rev. 1059, 1067-1068 (1955).
42. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 92 F.
Supp. 947,961 (D. Mass. 1950).
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international procedures. It was felt (a) that this problem was one
of international relations rather than national antitrust policy and
(b) that decision on the need for international measures of control
depended on a factual judgment of the extent to which our national
antitrust lavs can cope with international restraints, which the
committee had not made. A minority of the committee was of the
view that international measures of cooperation were desirable and
that specific consideration should be given to the United Nations
proposals to this end.43 These were set forth in draft articles of
agreement by the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Restric-
tive Business Practices. 44
At almost the date of the publication of the Report of the At-
torney General's National Committee, our government took the
position before the United Nations that the proposed draft articles
of agreement should not be adopted. Its conclusions were that
national policies and practices in this field varied so widely that the
proposed international agreement would be neither satisfactory nor
effective in eliminating international restrictive business practices."
The present position of the Department of State has been set forth
as follows
"The Department continues to believe in the importance of
developing greater cooperation among governments in other less
formal ways in handling common problems in this area. But we
believe that progress, to be healthy, must follow a normal pat-
tern of growth. This, we believe, is provided by the resolution
adopted by the Economic and Social Council in the spring."'
By its Resolution of May 26, 1955, the Economic and Social
Council failed to approve the draft articles of agreement but never-
theless reaffirmed its continuing concern with the problem and
urged governments to continue the examination of restrictive busi-
ness practices and means for lessening them. It also requested the
Secretary-General to arrange for the sharing of experience and
information in this field and to suggest further consideration of the
matter at a later session of the Council. It would appear, therefore.
43. Report 98-105. A rejoinder to the minority comment was made,
Report 105-108.
44. United Nations, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive
Business Practices 12 (U.N. Doc. E/2380, E/AC. 37/3, 30 March 1953)
45. Press release 2134, March 28, 1955. 32 Department of State Bulletin
665 (April 18,1955).
46. Statement by Thorsten V Kalijarvi, Acting Deputy Under Secre-
tary of State for Economic Affairs, before the Antitrust and Monopoly Sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, September 15, 1955. Icalijarvi,
Relation of Antitrust Policies to Foreign Trade and Investment, 33 Depart-
ment of State Bulletin 538. 542 (October 3, 1955)
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that this problem has now been handled in the international forum
by means appropriate to its character.4 7
In conclusion, -the preoccupation of the committee with anti-
trust doctrine and its failure to inquire into larger issues of public
policy should be neither a cause for criticism nor a source of satis-
faction. If the committee's summary of antitrust doctrine were to
become the future guide for judicial decision and its recommenda-
tions adopted, a remarkable forward step in antitrust policy would
have been made. The dissents within the committee itself, the re-
marks of commentators, the public debate concerning its work, all
indicate, however, that its report will have a persuasive rather than
an authoritative effect. The committee's work is a first and neces-
sary step but should not be the last step in developing antitrust
policy in foreign commerce.
The ultimate objective of antitrust policy abroad is simply the
promotion of our foreign commerce in the largest sense of that term.
Specific rules should be examined from the standpoint of whether
they encourage the development of our foreign trade and the in-
crease of our foreign investment. Any relaxation in the foreign ap-
plication of our antitrust law must clearly be demonstrated to be in
the national interest. Nevertheless, the national interest should be
served and not frustrated by the antitrust law.
" 47. See Carlston, supra note 21, at 723; Nitschke, supra note 41, at
1069; Donike, Te United Nations Draft Convention on Reslricti-ve Business
Practices, 4 Itnl, & Comp. L. Q. 129 (1955) ; Kopper, The International
Regulation of Cartels-Current Proposals, 40 Va. L. Rev. 1005 (1954);
Timberg, Restrictive Business Practices. 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 445 (1953).
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